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PUT AND CALL OPTIONS UNDER SECTION 16 OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
To counteract the abuses flowing from speculation in a corporation's secu-
rities by those in a position to have special knowledge of the corporation's
affairs or to manipulate its policies, section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 1 makes insiders, defined in section 16(a) as officers, directors,
or persons owning ten per cent of any one class of a corporation's registered
equity securities,2 liable to the corporation for any profits realized on the pur-
chase and sale (or sale and purchase) of any "equity securities of . . . [the]
issuer" within any period of six months.3 Although section 16(b) is regarded
as a "thoroughgoing" statute, intended to "squeeze all possible profits" out of
insider speculations, 4 its applicability to transactions involving puts and calls
on the stock of the insider's corporation is unclear. In view of the speculative
opportunities provided by these options,5 insiders may be tempted to turn to
them in an attempt to realize speculative profit free from the strictures of
section 16(b).
1. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958). For an exposition of the purposes
and operation of § 16, see Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 561-98 (1951) [hereinafter cited
as Loss].
2. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1958).
3. Section 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958), provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his rela-
tionship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or
any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer ... within any period
of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in con-
nection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director,
or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to re-
cover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the
name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit
within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same there-
after; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the (late such
profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction
where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale,
or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or trans-
actions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not com-
prehended with the purposes of this subsection.
4. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943).
5. See FILER, UNDERSTANDING PUT AND CALL OPTIONS 41-42, 53-55, 59-60, 62-64
(1959) [hereinafter cited as FILER] ; LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 363-78 (2d ed. 1957)
[hereinafter cited as LEFFLER].
6. The staff of the Division of Trading and Exchanges of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission is currently working on a factual study of puts and calls for the in-
PUTS AND CALLS
A put is a negotiable option contract giving the bearer the right to deliver
to the writer of the contract a certain number of shares of a particular stock
at a fixed price on or before a certain date.7 A call is a similar option giving
the bearer the right to buy securities.8 Both contracts are originally offered
for a "premium," determined -by the price of the stock, its past and projected
fluctuations on the market, the length of time before the option expires, and
the original difference, or "spread," between the stock's option and market
prices.9 Thereafter, the options themselves gain or lose in value as the spread
varies. Since the premium is small in relation to the underlying securities'
value, and market fluctuations are fully reflected in the value of the option,
puts and calls are extremely attractive speculative devices.' 0 Put and call
formation of the Commission in determining what, if any, action it should take with re-
gard to them. Letter From Phillip . Loomis, Director, Division of Trading and Ex-
changes, SEC, -to the Yale Law Journal, March 15, 1960, on file in Yale Law Library.
It is believed, however, that their current use by insiders is not widespread. Letter From
Harold V. Lese, Chief, Branch of Interpretation and Review, SEC, to the )'ale Law
Journal, Oct. 13, 1959, on file in Yale Law Library.
7. FmEx 20-21.
8. Id. at 24-25. Puts and calls are normally issued to cover blocks of 100 shares, id.
at 18-19, and are written for periods of 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, six months and 10
days, and occasionally for as long as a year, id. at 19. In addition, put and call dealers
offer "special" options which have been purchased by the dealer himself in the hopes that
they can be resold to customers. In terms of the spread, exercise price, and premium, see
text at note 9 infra, these options are slightly more advantageous than "new" options,
since the market movement which is necessary before the option wvill show a net paper-
profit is smaller than for new options. On the other hand, the risk that this market move-
ment will not occur is increased, since the option begins to run on the day the maker
delivers it to the dealer, not on the day the dealer sells it to a customer. Thus, an option
which originally ran for ninety days may have only eighty days remaining when the cus-
tomer receives -it. See id. at 31-34.
Other options, which are combinations of puts and calls, are not treated as such in this
Comment. A "straddle" is a combination of a put and a call in which both components
are exercisable at the same price. Id. at 34. A "spread" resembles a straddle, but its put
half-is exercisable at a price below current market, while its call half is exercisable at a
price above current market. Ibid. A "strip!' is a straddle with an extra put, id. at 106,
and a "strap!' is a straddle with an extra call, id. at 107.
9. See LFFL.R 369. Two types of options are prevalent today: the "wide-price" op-
tion, and options written "at the market." In the first a spread exists between exercise
price and market price on the day the option is issued; on a call the exercise price would
be higher than the market, and for a put it would be lower. In the "market" option the
exercise price is identical with the market price on the issue date. The premium charged
for a market option is always higher, since the risk for the optiunmaker is greater. See
id. at 367-70.
10. "One consequence of trading against an option is that it greatly magnifies the
opportunities for profit in relation to the amount of the investment .... " SEC Sec. Exch.
Act Release No. 4509, Oct. 30, 1950, p. 5. In a falling market, a put on 100 shares of
any stock will increase $100 in value with every point that the market drops, the only
variable as far as profits are concerned being the amount of the premium. For example,
a person may acquire a put option giving him the right to sell 100 shares of the stock of
A corporation to the writer of the put at $50 per share, paying a premium of $350 for
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
transactions which can lead to the realization of speculative profit range from
the simple purchase and sale of unexercised puts or calls to complex trans-
actions in which acquisition and exercise of the option are combined with pur-
chases and sales of the underlying stock. The purchase of an option may be
followed by its exercise and the subsequent repurchase or sale of the stock
involved. Or, an option may be used to immunize paper profits from future
market fluctuations. For example, the purchase of stock at a low price may
be followed by the acquisition of a put when the market rises. During the life
of the put, the speculator's profit would be protected by 'his power of exercise,
while he could benefit by any further upward movements by allowing the put
to expire and selling at the market price. Similar "profit freezing" can be
accomplished 'by selling stock during the life of a call acquired at a lower price,
acquiring a call at a low price following a sale of stock in a higher market, or
purchasing stock while holding a put exercisable at a -higher price.11 This
Comment will analyze various transactions involving puts and calls in order
to determine their proper treatment under section 16.
TRADING IN UNEXERCISED PUTS AND ,CALLS
As a method of insider speculation, purchase and sale of unexercised puts
and calls is no different from purchase and sale of the stock itself. Assume
that A, an insider, learns that his corporation has secured a profitable govern-
ment contract. Expecting the market to rise, he purchases stock at fifty dollars
before the information is made public. The expected market rise occurs, and
within three months the stock is selling at seventy dollars. A sale of the
appreciated stock at this point would clearly subject A to section 16(b) lia-
bility. But assume that instead of purchasing stock, A acquired a call, selling
it unexercised after its value had appreciated by the same amount as a result
of the same market rise.12 Similarly, had A's inside information led him to
expect a market decline, he might have sold his stock, repurchasing it at a
lower price; the same effect could be obtained by an acquisition and disposi-
tion of a put. The functional equivalence of the described option transactions
to those involving the stock itself suggests that liability should attach to the
former as well as the latter.
Section 9(b), which gives the Securities and Exchange Commission power
to regulate transactions in which puts, calls, and other options are acquired
the option. At this time he need own no stock at all. Should the market drop to $30, lie
may buy 100 shares for $3,000 and "put" them to the writer of the put for $5,000, leav-
ing a net profit of $1,650 minus brokerage fees, on a $350 investment. Calls provide sim.
ilar opportunities in a rising market. See FILm 41-43. For purposes of computing profits
throughout this Comment, taxes and brokerages fees will be disregarded.
11. For a detailed discussion of "profit-freezing" transactions see text at notes 61-84
infra.
12. A put and call broker, for example, will repurchase an option which shows a
paper-profit for a price equal to the spread between the net option price and the prevail-
ing market price, less two brokerage fees and taxes. FILER 38.
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in connection with dealings in stock,'3 is the only specific reference to puts and
calls in the act; but section 9's legislative history, demonstrating congressional
hostility to options used in market manipulation, makes it unlikely that Con-
gress intended to exempt insider trading in unexercised puts and calls from
the operation of the statute.' 4 Moreover, section 16(b)'s approach reveals a
general intent to prevent insider short-swing speculation 25 which, as viewed
by Congress, involved two evils. First, outsiders trading in the market are
prejudiced if they are forced to deal with persons whose peculiar position gives
them access to information unavailable to others.' 0 More important, specula-
tion by insiders, who normally are in a position to dictate corporate decisions,
was thought to be inconsistent with their position as fiduciaries for outside
shareholders.' 7 Thus, even if it be argued that the writers of puts and calls,
themselves -highly sophisticated investors,' 8 require no congressional protection
13. 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1958).
14. One of Congress' chief concerns was the use of the options as an aid to market
manipulation by stock pools, see S. RE'. No. 792, 734 Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934), the
members of which would take an option at a low price and exercise it after pool opera-
tions had driven the market upwards, see Lr.rnFXa 338-47 (describing pool operations).
Thus pool operations were prohibited by § 9(a), 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C § 78i(a)
(1958). See Frey, Federal Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Market, 106
U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 22 (1957). Indeed, although the less stringent provisions of § 9 were
ultimately adopted, see H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934) ; Loss 306,
Herbert Filer, representing the Put and Call Brokers and Dealers Association, vas
obliged to defend the usefulness and economic value of the put and call business, so that
all options would not be blanketly prohibited, FILER 10, 77-78.
15. The near impossibility of proving the intent to abuse inside information led to the
establishment of an admittedly arbitrary "objective measure of proof" whereby any trans-
action carried out within six months gives rise to a conclusive presumption that insiders
have used inside information unfairly. Smolowe v. Delendo, 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); see Loss 564; Hardee, Stock Options and the "Inssider
Trading" Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, 65 HAnv. L Rn'. 997, 993, 1007
(1952).
16. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
17. Ibid. Congress found numerous cases of market manipulation by speculating in-
siders, and discovered at least one instance in which a corporation had followed an un-
sound dividend policy during a period when one of its insiders was speculating actively.
See S. Rn'. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
18. Options are usually written by wealthy stockholders, funds, trusts, and insurance
companies. Optionmakers ordinarily have large, varied holdings in securities, and put-and-
call dealers are reported hesitant to deal with individuals with less than $50,000 capital.
The primary object of an optionmaker in writing puts and calls on his securities is to
supplement the income on his investment. If a put or a call he has issued expires un-
exercised, the premium may be thought of as additional income on the security In order
to make his option selling profitable, the optionmaker must deal in averages, hoping that
his informed guesses as to market trends will be right more often than not. If the market
moves against him, the maker will either be forced to take securities at a price higher
than the prevailing market or, if a call is exercised, sell securities for a price lower than
the market. Thus he must normally sell many options in order that the premiums re-
ceived compensate for his wrong guesses. See Fnx.nR 96-99; LrFaLa 372-73.
19601
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from those with advance information, the possibility that these very evils may
be perpetrated through insider trading in unexercised puts and calls militates
against excluding ,these options from 16(b).
The SEC's only specific pronouncement on puts and calls is ambiguous.
Rule 16a-l (h) provides that, for purposes of the reporting requirements of
section 16(a), "the acquisition or disposition of any transferable option, put,
call, spread or straddle shall be deemed such a change in the beneficial owner-
ship of the security to which such privilege relates" as to require reporting
of the acquisition and disposition of puts and calls on securities of the insider's
corporation. 19 Since one purpose of section 16(a) is to publicize transactions
which give rise to section 16(b) liability, 20 rule 16a- I(h) may indicate Com-
mission belief that puts and calls are contemplated by 16(b). On the other
hand, a frequently mentioned policy behind section 16(a) is that disclosure
alone will discourage many transactions regardless of 16(b) liability,2 1 and a
later SEC release pointed out that not all transactions required to be reported
lead to 16(b) liability.2 2 Accordingly, rule 16a-1 (h) should be viewed as only
a clarification of the reporting requirements and not as an indication that puts
and calls are or are not within the purview of section 16(b).
Since the purposes of that section would 'be best served by including puts
and calls, and since neither ;Congress nor the SEC has evinced any clear in-
tention of excluding them, the principal problem facing a court is the semantic
one of fitting these options into the statutory definition of "equity security."
"Equity security" is defined in section 3(a) (11) as "any stock, or similar
security; or any security convertible ... into such a security, or carrying any
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such war-
rant or right... ," and the SEC is empowered to define other securities as
equity securities when necessary to serve the purposes of the act.23 But, as in-
dicated above, the Commission has 'been silent on this topic; although rule 16a-
1 (h)'s declaration that acquisition of options "shall be deemed . . . a change
in beneficial ownership" may suggest that the SEC hesitated to classify puts
and calls as equity securities, the Commission, had it wished to exclude puts
and calls from 16(b), would have done so under the express power granted
to it by that section to exempt transactions "not comprehended" by the statu-
tory purpose,24 rather than by negative implication.
19. 1.7 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(h) (Supp. 1959). Exercise of these options must also be
reported. Ibid.
20. See Loss 564-65; Yourd, Trading in Securities By Directors, Officers and Stock-
holders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 'MICH. L. REV. 133, 139 (1939).
21. See, e.g., Loss 77-82. "Because it is difficult to draw a clear line as a matter of
law between truly inside information and information generally known by the better-in-
formed investors, the most potent weapon against the abuse of inside information is full
and prompt publicity." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). It has been
suggested, however, that disclosure alone is not an effective deterrent. See Loss 78-81.
22. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 4801, Feb. 20, 1953, p. 2.
23. 48 Stat. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (11) (1958).
24. Section 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
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Calls can easily be classified as equity securities under the language "war-
rants or similar right." But the various rights denominated "equity securities"
in section 3(a) (11) are rights to purchase or acquire, rather than to dispose
of "any stock or similar security." Thus, puts cannot be brought within this
language, although the fact that they can be used for the same speculative pur-
pose as calls suggests that they should be given similar treatment. A court
could accomplish this result by including puts in the phrase "stock or similar
security." It is generally conceded that puts, as well as calls, are "securities"
for purposes of the act-' Furthermore, the term "equity security" (as differ-
entiated from "security") is used only in section 16. This seems to indicate
that Congress intended the term to cover those securities which, because their
market prices are extremely sensitive to changes in corporate fortunes, provide
insiders with the opportunity to reap short-swing profits by using them for
speculation. In a functional sense, then, puts can be viewed as "similar" to
stock, and thus equity securities under section 3(a) (11) 26
The question remains, however, whether such a broad reading of the statute
in the absence of an exercise of the SEC's definitional power might be con-
sidered an assumption by a court of powers primarily delegated to the Com-
mission. But no particular administrative expertise is required to find that puts
provide the speculative opportunities which Congress sought to control. More-
over, court action here would not render the Commission's definitional power
meaningless. Should the Commission disagree, it retains the power under sec-
tion 16(b) to exclude puts as transactions "not comprehended within the pur-
pose" of the act. Therefore, a court should not hesitate to bring puts within
section 16 only because the Commission has not spoken on the matter. On the
other hand, the possibility that semantic difficulties may lead some courts to
adopt a narrow definition of "equity security," allowing insiders to retain the
profits from speculation in puts, suggests that reliance on judicial action would
be misplaced and that the SEC should exercise its statutory power and bring
puts within 3(a)(11).
A second argument which may be advanced to avoid insider liability on short-
swing transactions in unexercised puts and calls turns upon the meaning of
the phrase "any equity security of such issuer" in section 16(b) ; if the itali-
cized phrase means issued "by the corporation," puts and calls, issued by third
parties, are not covered. "Of the issuer" is introduced in section 16(a) to
25. See Loss 306. The Uniform Commercial Code once explicitly considered puts as
securities. UNioR Com:RrcrL CODE § 8-102 (Proposed Final Draft 1950). Later drafts
fail to mention puts. But the latest draft defines a security as "an instrument which is
issued in bearer or registered form... of a type commonly dealt in upon securities ex-
changes or markets or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in
as a medium for investment." UiN-0omR COMERCIAL CODE § 8-102. And the comment
following regards the term "security" as "anything which securities markets ... are likely
to regard as suitable for trading." UxNoRm C0mERCIA, CODE § 8-102, comment at
530-31.
26. Compare Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange A-Ict,
66 HA v. L. Rxv. 385, 394-95 (1953).
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identify which officers, directors, and stockholders are covered-they must be
of a corporation which has issued any registered security.2 7 Hence, since "such
issuer" in the succeeding subsection refers to "issuer of any registered secu-
rity," not necessarily of the particular security involved in a section 16 trans-
action, the word "issuer" in 16(b) carries no meaning beyond "corporation
included within section 16." Therefore, it is at least as reasonable to read "of"
as meaning "relating to," one of its commonly accepted senses,28 as to define
it as "issued by." The "relating to" construction eliminates from section 16
a possible distinction between securities issued by the corporation and paper
issued by others which pertains to and derives its value from those securities,
and thus serves the plan of the statute, for in order for the dangers of insider
speculation to be present, it is not necessary that a particular equity security
be issued 'by the insider's corporation, but only that the security be so related
to the corporation that its market price will fluctuate with changes in cor-
porate fortunes.
Hence, insider trading in unexercised puts and calls would seem to belong
within the bounds of section 16(b). Even assuming that conclusion, however,
an argument might 'be made for imposing additional restrictions upon such
trading, either by extending the 16(b) holding period for unexerclsed options
or by prohibiting completely their transfer by insiders. A decision to make
long-term (more than six months) profits from trading in 'unexercised puts
and calls recoverable would be 'based on three premises. First, it may be be-
lieved that possession of unexercised options furnishes an extremely favorable
vantage point from which to watch the market, and therefore a greater like-
lihood of abuse from inside information than does possession of stock. Second,
options, which may 'be acquired with a relatively small amount of capital, may
increase the temptation for an insider to indulge in market manipulation.
Third would come the argument that since, under SEC rule 16b-6 and its
case law, long-term increment in the value of an option to purchase is recover-
able when, within a separate six-month period, the option is exercised and the
stock then sold, 29 long-term appreciation in an option's value should be re-
coverable when the option is transferred as well.
Trading in negotiable options should, however, be treated identically with
trading in other equity securities. The recoverability of an option's long-term
27. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1958):
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted secu-
rity) which is registered on a national securities exchange, or who is a director or
an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of
such security or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, director,
or officer, a statement with the exchange ... of the amount of all equity securities
of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner...
(Emphasis added.)
28. Mm m-WnsTmR NE w INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY 1689 (2d ed. 1957).
29. See text at notes 44-46 infra.
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increment in value under rule 16b-6 is not a persuasive argument to the con-
trary, since, as will be demonstrated, that rule is improper as applied to freely
transferable options, and the inconsistency between allowing long-term profits
in options to be recovered when the option is exercised and refusing recovery
when the option is transferred should be resolved in favor of the latter route 0°
Further, from the standpoint of the misuse of insider information, it can be
demonstrated that investment in puts or calls is economically no more attrac-
tive than investment in stock. The buyer of a call, for example, is in effect
betting that the market price of the stock will rise, within a certain period,
more than the prevailing market estimate. Unlike the buyer of stock, who can
minimize his losses by selling if the stock fails to appreciate, the holder of a
call stands to lose his entire investment (the amount of the premium) unless
the rise he expects occurs. Because of the risk involved, calls must offer a
return in proportion to the odds against success. Thus, the greater volatility
of puts and calls reflects the fact that the purchase of an option is a bet against
greater odds than a purchase of stock. The insider's confidential knowledge
can, of course, give him an advantage, whether he buys stock or buys an
option. But the assumption of 16(b) that within the six-month holding period
various unpredictable factors will nullify this advantage seems as applicable
to trading in unexercised options as to trading in stock. If the insider in fact
has no advance information, a call, for example, is an extremely unattractive
bet. Its cost will be set to attract investors willing to wager that the price of
the underlying security will rise sufficiently at some time during the life of the
call to make risking the premium worthwhile. If 16(b) is applied to calls,
without more, the insider is forced to bet that his stock will attain (or main-
tain) a high level after the six-month period. Thus the odds against him are
greater than those against the noninsider, although his return will be the same.
Accordingly, it would seem extremely unlikely that an insider would buy one
in order to obtain a favorable position from which to watch the market.
31
Finally, although the possibility of using puts and calls as a low-investment
prelude to market manipulation might theoretically justify a differentiation be-
tween options and other equity securities, it is doubtful whether such a dif-
ferentiation is a practical necessity. Manipulative schemes may in fact be effec-
tively deterred 'by other sections of the act,32 and corporate management may
now subscribe to higher ethical standards than those which the draftsmen of
the 1934 act sought to correct.
30. See text at notes 43-51 infra.
31. Nonetheless, puts and calls may be more attractive speculative devices than other
securities requiring more substantial investment. It is an observable phenomenon that
people are more willing to risk one dollar at 100 to 1 odds with a 50 to I payoff than one
hundred dollars at 3 to 2 odds with a 3 to 2 return. See Freidman & Savage, The Utility
Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, in RzADriGs IN PaicE TnroRy 57 (Stigler & Bould-
ing ed. 1953).
32. Section 9(a), 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1958), prohibits manipu-
lation of market prices through the use of stock pools; § 10, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (1958), prohibits fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.
1960]
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TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING BOTH PUTS AND CALLS AND THE UNDERLYING
STOCK
Exercising a Put or Call as Step One in a Short-Sqwing Transaction in
Stock
Option Held for Less Than Six Months
When the exercise of a call is followed or preceded by a sale of the under-
lying stock within six months--or when the exercise of a put is similarly
combined with a purchase of the underlying stock-a court would undoubted-
ly find liability.33 It is well settled that the acquisition of stock through the
exercise of an option is a "purchase" within the meaning of section 16('b) ;04
the exercise of a put, or option to sell, is a sale as that term is generally used
and would be so treated under section 16(b). Finding liability here has been
criticized on the theory that no fundamental difference exists 'between, for ex-
ample, the acquisition of an option to buy on January 1 and its disposition
unexercised on July 2-a transaction free from liability-and the sale on July
2 of stock acquired by exercising the same option in March. This criticism
views the profit in the second transaction as the result of a long-term incre-
ment in the stock's value between acquisition and exercise of the option, and
therefore beyond the reach of section 16(bb).35 But when the option in question
is a put, call, or other option with a fixed termination date, its exercise may
properly be viewed as the beginning of a new six-month period. Section 16
(b)'s requirement of a substantial holding period seems predicated, at least
in part, on a theory that inside information is likely to become stale within
six months, since market fluctuations, especially those which are artificially
stimulated, are generally of short duration. Thus any transaction which pro-
vides an insider with the opportunity to profit from new information should
start a new six-month period.36 The holder of a call, for example, must ulti-
mately decide whether to exercise it, sell it unexercised, or allow it to expire, and,
assuming favorable market movements during the life of the option, he could
realize profit by selling it unexercised. A decision to exercise it instead may
be attributed either to a desire to take advantage of market fluctuations which
fresh inside information indicates will take place after the expiration date of
33. Cf. Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd per curiamn, 190
F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1951).
34. Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
907 (1949); see Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957) (option issued pursuant
to employee compensation plan) ; Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950),
aff'd per curiam, 190 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1951) (stock options) ; ef. Park & Tilford, Inc.
v. Schulte, 160 F.,d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947) (conversion of
preferred stock into common). But cf. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958)
("involuntary" conversion of preferred stock held not a purchase).
35. Hardee, Stock Options and the "Insider Trading" Provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act, 65 HARv. L. REv. 997, 1007 (1952).
36. Cf. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 n.3 (6th Cir. 1958). See also SEC
Exch. Act Release No. 4509, Oct. 30, 1950.
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the option,3 7 or to a desire to make a long-range investment in the corpora-
-tion. Subsequent sale of the stock within six months eliminates any possibility
of the long-range investment motive, and section 16(b) liability should attach.
Similar considerations govern when a put, rather than a call, is involved.
Once liability is found, the court must calculate recoverable profit. The
simplest approach would be to hold the insider liable for the difference be-
tween option price and the ultimate sale or repurchase price, less, of course,
the option's cost.38 When an option is held less than six months before exer-
cise, this approach would be proper. Since exercise of an option ends its life
and destroys its independent value, exercise of a call may be regarded equi-
valent to its sale coupled with a simultaneous purchase of stock; exercise of
a put as equivalent to its sale coupled with a sale of stock. Thus, for example,
exercising a call after holding it less than six months and selling the under-
lying stock thus acquired within six months of exercise may properly be re-
garded as two short-swing transactions-one in the option, the other in the
stock. Therefore, measuring recovery by the difference between option price
and ultimate sale price does not involve, as has been suggested, the inconsistent
use of a short holding period for the purpose of finding liability, and a longer
accrual period for the purpose of measuring profit.-3 Rather, it is simply the
recovery of the entire amount of speculative profit on two short-swing trans-
actions.
Regarding exercise of an option as equivalent to a sale thereof raises an-
other question, -however; should liability attach when acquisition and exercise
of an option occur within six months, even if the underlying stock is immobile
thereafter? Ownership of an option obviously enables an insider to enter the
market at a more favorable price than those who purchase or sell stock at
market price on the date he exercises. When this advantage is attributable to
a short-term market fluctuation, it would not be contrary to the purpose of
16(b) to treat insider acquisition and exercise as a purchase-sale combination
leading to recovery of the difference between option price and market price
at exercise date, less the option's cost. But the longer an insider holds the
stock he acquires (or refrains from repurchasing stock he has held) the less
likely it becomes that the original acquisition ("purchase") and exercise
("sale") of the option was motivated 'by a desire to realize "short-swing"
profits. Although motive is irrelevant once a purchase-sale combination has
been found,40 it may be crucial in determining whether a given transaction
constitutes a "purchase" or "sale."41 It should be noted, however, that allow-
37. See Comment, 59 YALu L.J. 510, 524-26 (1950).
38. See SEC Bxch. Act Release No. 4509, Oct. 30, 1950, p. 2.
39. Hardee, supra note 35, at 1006.
40. "[Short-swing profits] shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective
of any intention on the part of [the insider] ... of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months." Section 16(b), 48
Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
41. Cf. Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). ("By the ap-
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ing recovery in this situation would not penalize the insider, but would only
nullify any advantage he gained as the result of his short-term holding of the
option. If it is held that acquisition and exercise of an option within six months
constitutes a 16(b) purchase-sale combination, a remaining problem is deter-
mining when, if at all, recoverable profits were "realized," as required by sec-
tion 16(b). In the case of a put transaction, the insider will receive cash when
'he exercises. Little conceptual or practical difficulty would arise if the proceeds
attributable to the "sale" of the option were deemed immediately "realized," 4
and the insider thereafter treated as if he had sold stock at the market price
prevailing on exercise date, with further liability accruing only if, within the
ensuing six months, he engaged in further market operation equivalent to a
"purchase." The exercise of a call, on the other 'hand, involves a substantial
investment in the underlying stock and the receipt of stock only. And the in-
sider will remain subject to the risk of the market as the -price of his stock
fluctuates. Thus it would seem that no profit from the "sale" of the call could
be "realized" until he resold the stock. At that time 'he could be forced to
surrender profits equivalent to the monetary advantage he gained as a result
of acquiring the stock at call price within six months of acquiring the call.
Options Held for Six Months or More
Profits on a short-swing in stock commenced by exercise of an option should
be measured differently when the put or call involved in the transaction is held
for more than six months prior to exercise. 43 After -holding a put or call for
six months, an insider could sell the option unexercised, retaining the resulting
long-swing profits without liability. In the case of a call, for example, were
the proceeds of such sale, together with additional cash, used to purchase
stock, the cost basis of the stock for the purpose of determining profits on a
subsequent short-swing sale would be the total cash layout, that is, actual cost
of stock at market price, and the insider would retain the profits resulting
from the long-swing increment in the call's value. To illustrate, assume that
an insider acquires a call on January 1 which gives him the right to buy stock
at ten dollars. Assume further that he exercises the call on August 1, when
the stock's market price is twenty dollars, and sells the stock at thirty dollars
on September 1. Had he sold, rather than exercised, the call on August 1, he
would have earned ten dollars profit free from liability, since that profit would
have 'been the result of long-swing appreciation of the call. Similarly, the only
short-swing profit stemming from exercise and ultimate sale is ten dollars, the
plication of familiar principles the transaction falls into one category or another depend-
ing upon the intention of the parties"; gift of warrants held not a "sale").
42. For example, if a put is acquired to sell stock at $50, and subsequently exercised
while the prevailing market is at $40, $10 of the $50 received for the stock may be at-
tributed to the disposition of the option, since only $40 would have been realized on the
stock had it been sold in the open market.
43. See Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchagge Act, 66
HLv. L. Rav. 612, 623-24 (1953).
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difference between thirty dollars (eventual sale price) and twenty dollars (op-
tion price plus market value of option at date of exercise, which would be
equal to market price of stock at date of exercise), while the recovery of the
difference between thirty dollars (eventual sale price) and ten dollars (option
price) would include ten dollars of long-swing profit. Therefore, a rule may
be stated: when stock is acquired through exercise of a freely transferable
option such as a call, which has been held for over six months, the basis of
the stock for the purposes of determining recoverable profits in a subsequent
short-swing should be the cash paid for it, plus the market value of the option
on the date of exercise, or, in other words, the stock's market price at that
date.
At present, however, computation of recoverable profits in transactions in
which the purchase of stock is pursuant to the exercise of an option which has
been held for more than six months may be governed by SEC rule 16b-6.
4
Under this rule, profits are measured by subtracting from the proceeds of the
sale the lowest market price of the stock within a period of six months before
or after the sale. If applied to the hypothetical transaction just outlined, the
rule would allow recovery of the difference between thirty dollars and the
stock's lowest market price attained in the year beginning March 1, a figure
no larger than and probably smaller than twenty dollars; the rule would there-
fore allow recovery of long-swing profits. The only reported case in which rule
16b-6 has been applied is Blau v. Hodgkinson, decided by the Southern District
of New York.45 There, an insider who had made a short-swing sale of stock
acquired by exercising warrants he had 'held for nearly five years settled with his
corporation by surrendering profits of 890 dollars, computed by subtracting the
value of the warrants on the exercise date plus warrant price, from the pro-
ceeds of the sale. The plaintiff contended that profits must be computed by
subtracting exercise price from sale price, making the recoverable profits
9,856 dollars. In an amicus curiae brief, the SEC urged retroactive application
of rule 16b-6, under which recoverable profits were 1,820 dollars. The court's
,adoption of the rule may have been motivated by a desire to reach what it
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (Supp. 1959):
(a) To the extent specified in paragraph (b) of this section the Commission here-
by exempts as not comprehended within the purposes of section 16(b) of the act
any transaction or transactions involving the purchase and sale or sale and purchase
of any equity security where such purchase is pursuant to the exercise of an option
or similar right either (1) acquired more than six months before its exercise, or
(2) acquired pursuant to the terms of an employment contract entered into more
than six months before its exercise.
(b) In respect of transactions specified in paragraph (a) of this section the profits
inuring to the issuer shall not exceed the difference between the proceeds of sale
and the lowest market price of any security of the same class within six months
before or after the date of sale. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to enlarge
the amount of profit which would inure to the issuer in the absence of the section.
45. 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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felt was an equitable result. But its rejection of the defendant's contention that
the settlement was a bar to the action was justified on the ground that the
settlement had not been made in accordance with the method of profit com-
putation "defined by... [the] appellate court ' 40 of its circuit. Furthermore,
the court must have believed that the plaintiff's proposed measure of recovery
would have been correct in the absence of 16b-6 since the rule by its terms
is not supposed to increase the amount of profit otherwise recoverable.
But excluding from recovery profits resulting from long-term increment in
a call's value is by no means foreclosed even in the Second Circuit. The
Hodgkinson court cited no authority in support of its statement that rules of
profit computation "defined 'by ... [its] appellate court" made the defendant's
settlement inadequate. Indeed, had the court followed the decision of its court
of appeals in Park & Tilford. Inc. V. Shulte,47 the Hodgkinson settlement
should have been held proper, assuming that the parties had correctly calcu-
lated the market value of the warrants. Park & Tilford involved the conver-
sion of preferred stock to common stock, with a subsequent sale of the com-
mon within six months. There the court held that the purchase price of the
common was the market value of the preferred on the date of conversion. Al-
though no money was exchanged for the common in Park & Tilford, this
factor does not support the implicit holding of the Hodgkinson case that when
cash is paid in the exercise transaction, only the cash is relevant in determin-
ing the basis of the acquired stock. Rather, since the exercise of the warrants
in Hodgkinson was analogous to the Park & Tilford conversion transaction,
the court should have allowed the market value of the warrants to be con-
sidered in computing profits. And, if calls are equity securities, the Securities
Exchange Act indicates no reason why they also should not be treated similar-
ly to the preferred stock in Park & Tilford.
48
46. Id. at 371,
47. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
48. But cf. Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd per curiam,
190 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1951). In Steinberg, defendants resold stock within six months of
its acquisition pursuant to employee "incentive" options. The options had been exercised
more than six months after their acquisition; in fact, the right to exercise did not accrue
until one year after they were acquired. The court explicitly rejected the defendants' con-
tention that the cost basis of the stock should include the worth of the option on the day
it was exercised, on the grounds that defendants in similar situations could evade § 16
merely by holding options for a long time and then reselling the stock acquired while the
market was still high. On the other hand, since the court recognized that some of the
value of the option "represented long-term increment" in the value of the underlying
stock, the cost-basis was held to include the worth of the option on the day the right to
exercise accrued, as this would "represent the amount of compensation which the cor-
poration paid the defendant pursuant to its agreement.... ." 95 F. Supp. at 34. While
the method of computation chosen in this case may have a deterrent effect upon specu-
lation in employment options, it allows the amount of recovery to turn solely on the for-
tuitous movement of the market between issuance of the option and accrual date. And
even if it is proper to assume that the corporation intended any market rise to be "corn-
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Admittedly, adoption of the computation method here advocated would
nullify rule 16b-6's application to transactions involving the exercise of calls.
But nullification in this manner would be both desirable and proper, as the rule
is defective in several respects. First, it utilizes the six-month holding period
as an arbitrary aid to measurement of profits, whereas under the statute the
purpose of the six-month time limitation is to define the speculative transactions
which lead to liability. Second, 16b-6 permits profits to be computed on the basis
of market fluctuations taking place after, as well as before, the sale.40 The SEC
has indicated that this aspect of the rule was intended to eliminate the possi-
bility that insiders would use their inside information to predict a market de-
dine, selling when the market was at its crest.r0 Thus, not only is the amount
of recovery fortuitous, but the reason for allowing it goes beyond the thrust
of the statute, which is obviously not designed to penalize selling at the crest
unless such selling is coupled with a subsequent repurchase. Finally, 16b-6
may be beyond the Commission's rulemaking power. Section 16(b) permits
the Commission to exempt "transactions," but says nothing as to its power to
limit or increase recoverable profits once liability has been found.5 '
When the initial step in a short-swing transaction is the exercise of a put
which has been held for more than six months, courts should recognize that
by exercising the put the insider has given up an option with independent
market value. As this value is attributable to a long-swing decline in the
market price of the stock subject to the option, it should not be included in
computing the profits recoverable should the insider repurchase the stock with-
in six months. This result can be accomplished by subtracting the market value
of the put on the exercise date from the cash profits realized on the short-
swing transaction. Since 16b-6 does not apply to options to sell, a court should
-have no difficulty adopting this approach, which is identical to that proposed
for calls.
An objection to limiting the amount of profit recoverable on a short-swing
merely because the put or call exercised has been held more than six months
is that this approach permits the insider to assume a fixed market position
from which to watch the market, committing himself to a substantial invest-
ment in the stock of his corporation-or reducing his equity ownership--only
pensation," insiders -who anticipate a future market rise, and who presumably control
their own corporations, might evade § 16 by issuing options with a distant accrual date.
Finally, the court, in allowing the worth of the options at accrual to be included in the
cost-basis, recognized the propriety of allowing some long-term increment to be retained.
Steinberg's allowance of recovery of other long-term increment cannot, therefore, be con-
trolling as to puts and calls, whose accrual date is coincident with acquisition date; to
compute basis according to accrual date would be to deny completely any long-term profit
upon exercise.
49. See text of rule 16b-6, supra note 44.
50. SEC Exch. Act Release No. 4509, Oct. 30, 1950.
51. See Hardee, mipra note 35, at 1006; cf. Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 566
(2d Cir. 1952).
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after the market has swung in his favor.5r2 Furthermore, as the SEC pointed
out in the release accompanying 16b-6, options were a concomitant of the
market manipulations of insider stock pools. 8 Thus it may be felt that options
present such a danger of insider abuse that an arbitrary deterrent such as rule
16b-6 is justified. But, as has 'been pointed out, transfers of unexercised puts
and calls 'probably require no greater surveillance than transfer of other secu-
rities.5 And the history of 16b-6 indicates that the rule in its present form
was an attempt to leave to the courts the problems created 'by option exercise.
In a statement accompanying a proposed earlier version of 16b-6, the Com-
mission stated flatly that the correct purchase price of a security acquired
through option exercise should be only option cost plus option price.5 5 The
original rule was then proposed in order to temper liability, by requiring re-
covery to be computed by the method now provided in 16b-6. The rule pro-
vided that recoverable profit was not to exceed the difference 'between sale
price and "the sum of the cost of the option and the exercise price."' 0 After
receiving public comment on the proposed rule, however, the Commission with-
drew it, noting that so much uncertainty appeared to exist as to the correct
method of computing the cost of stock acquired through exercise of options
that no rule should issue prior to judicial determination of the matter. 1 No
further judicial determination took place prior to the promulgation of the
present 16b-6. The new rule replaced the previous maximum recovery with
the ambiguous phrase, "nothing in this section shall 'be deemed to enlarge the
amount of profit which would inure to the issuer in the absence of this sec-
tion."58 In the accompanying release, the 'Commission conceded that the
method of computing cost basis was not entirely settled, and that the new rule
left the courts room to minimize recoverable profits by construing the section
16(b) phrase "profits realized by" to exclude all long-term increment in op-
tion value.59 By thus giving the courts what amounts to a choice 'between com-
puting recoverable profits under the rule or under an analogy to Park & Til-
ford, the Commission sidestepped the issue of whether transferrable options
actually create such dangers of market abuse that special treatment is war-
ranted. Unless and until a contrary solution, which will cover 'both exercise
52. See Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; Steinberg
v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32, 33-34 (S.DiN.Y. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 190 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1951).
53. See SEC Exch. Act Release No. 4509, Oct. 30, 1950; SEC Exch. Act Release
No. 4045, Feb. 6, 1948.
54. See text at notes 29-32 supra.
55. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 4045, Feb. 6, 1948. The Commission stated that re-
covery of profits so computed was "not only 'comprehended within the purpose of'
Section 16(b), but essential to prevent its evasion in view of the historic use of the op-
tion device in connection with manipulations."
56. Ibid.
57. SEC Exch. Act Release No. 4145, Aug. 6, 1948.
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (Supp. 1959).
59. SEC Exch. Act Release No. 4045, Feb. 6, 1948.
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and sale of puts and calls, is reached by Congress, application of any rule
which allows recovery of a long-term increment in the value of an option, the
exercise of which 'begins a short-swing transaction in stock, will penalize form
rather than substance, and must be based not on the presumptions of the stat-
ute but upon the "possibility of [insider] abuse as supposed and conjectured
by judges."' 0
Exercising or Selling a Put or Call as Delayed Step Two in a Short-Swing
Transaction in Stock: "Profit-Freczing" Transactions
Different considerations apply when an option is used as a hedge to protect
short-swing "paper" profits from later market fluctuations. These "profit-freez-
ing" transactions are characterized by the purchase or sale of stock and the
acquisition of a put or call within six months, followed by actual realization
of the ensuing profit through exercise or disposition of the option more than
six months after the transaction is begun. Assume, for example, that an in-
sider, expecting a short-term rise, purchases stock at forty dollars. Before the
six-month holding period expires the market rises to ninety dollars. In an
effort to avoid section 16(b) liability without exposing himself to the risk that
the market will drop before the shares can be sold, the insider may purchase
a put, entitling .him to sell his shares at ninety dollars any time during the life
of the put."' Should the market then drop, the insider will simply wait until
the six-month holding period expires and then exercise the put, selling at
ninety dollars the stock he bought at forty dollars. Such a maneuver may evade
16(b) unless it is possible to treat the acquisition of the put as a sale of stock
in order to match it against the original purchase for purposes of finding lia-
bility. Three other option transactions present the same problem. Stock may
be sold at a high price, and a call acquired after the market drops. Or the
option may be acquired before a purchase or sale. When the market is rising,
acquisition of a call before a sale of stock already owned ensures ability to
repurchase at a lower price. In a falling market, acquisition of a put may be
followed by the purchase of stock. In each of the four transactions discussed,
the trader has guaranteed himself a profit of no less than the difference be-
tween his purchase or sale price and the exercise price of the option, less the
cost of the option. By delaying exercise of the option, he has only delayed
realization of this profit.
60. The quoted language is that of Judge Lumbard's criticism of the majority's dis-
approval of SEC rule 16b-3, in his dissenting opinion on petition for rehearing in Greene
v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689, 697 (2d Cir. 1957).
61. See PuT AxD CALL BRoxERs AxD DFALEnS Ass'x, INa, PuT OPTION AND CAMu
Opnoxq CoNrTacrs 8 (3d ed. 1958); Fi.za 4647. Stop-loss orders as well as puts can
be used to protect profits, but they offer less opportunity to evmde § 16(b). Use of a put
enables a postponement of profit realization that is impossible with a stop-loss order,
which operates automatically when a predetermined market price has been reached. With
puts, the selling price is guaranteed for the life of the option, while a stop-loss order
ensures only the best price obtainable after the predetermined "stop" price has been
reached. See FI 52.
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Thus, acquisition of an option can put an insider in a position to complete
a purchase or sale at prices which prevailed during a six-month period in
which he is presumed to have had an opportunity to take advantage of inside
information. In order to treat these transactions properly, courts must regard
acquisition of the option as equivalent to a purchase or sale in order to match
it against the complementary purchase or sale of stock. The initial problem,
therefore, is the verbal one of fitting acquisition of an option to purchase or
to sell into statutory descriptions of "purchase" and "sale." Section 3(a) (13)
defines "buy" and "purchase" to "include any contract to buy, purchase or
otherwise acquire";02 section 3(a)(14) defines "sale" similarly. a Puts and
calls are popularly referred to as "contracts,"'I but this appellation is of no
relevance in determining their status under section 3(a). They may be de-
scribed as unilateral contracts in which the premium is paid in consideration
for the option-writer's promise to buy or sell stock at a certain price."0 But
such an option contract is not a contract to 'buy or sell stock, but rather one
to make an offer to buy or sell stock at a particular price irrevocable.00 Thus,
as a matter of general contract law outside the framework and policies of the
Securities Exchange Act, a put or a call would be classified as an irrevocable
offer to enter a unilateral contract, which would not ripen into a "contract"
until accepted through exercise.67 But, 'because of the irrevocable nature of the
option-writer's promise, the principal functional distinction between an offer
for a unilateral contract and such a contract itself-the promisor is bound in
the latter, but not in the former-is here obliterated. Arguably. however, Con-
gress' use of the term "contract" referred only to contracts in which both
buyer and seller are bound. Indeed, in Stella v. Grahamt-Paige Motors Corp.,08
the court stated 'broadly that "until both parties are bound there is no 'pur-
chase' or 'sale' under the act."6 9 If this definition of purchase or sale governs,
the transactions under discussion will be exempt from 16(b) 'because the op-
tion-holder is free not to exercise. This reading of the statute would be un-
desirable in the context of puts and calls, since all a speculating insider needs
to profit from inside information is "firm assurance that a fixed quantity [of
stock] can be acquired or disposed of at a fixed price." 70 It should make no
62. 48 Stat. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1958).
63. 48 Stat. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1958).
64. E.g., FILER 18-19.
65. See RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 12 (1932) (unilateral contract defined).
66. See id. § 46.
67. See id. § 52; Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1949) (warrants "not
themselves a contract -to acquire shares ... [but] mere offers by 'the corporation").
68. 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), remanded for findings, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). The case was remanded for a finding on the question
of profits, 232 F.2d at 302, but the court of appeals agreed with the district court's stand-
ard for determining a purchase and sale, id. at 30L
69. 132 F. Supp. at 104.
70. Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954); cf. Falco v. Donner Foun-




difference whether he enters into a contract binding on both parties or acquires
an option under which the obligations of the option writer are fixed. In Stella
the party with whom the insider was dealing retained power to withdraw from
the contract until the date when both became bound.7' Thus Stella is readily
distinguishable from -the put and call situation in which only the insider may
withdraw. In any event, to rule that acquisition of a put or call is not a sale
or purchase simply because it does not seem to be a "contract" because the
insider is not bound, or, indeed, has not "accepted" through performance is to
ignore both the broad purposes of section 16(b) and the language of section
3 (a). According to 3 (a)'s preamble, its definitions apply only "unless the con-
text otherwise requires." 72 In the profit-freezing transactions here under dis-
cussion, short-swing profits arise between sale or purchase of stock and ac-
quisition of an option, and only realization is postponed until exercise. The
context of 16(b) would therefore require that the acquisition of an option be
deemed a purchase or sale when necessary to prevent the retention of short-
swing profits.
Regarding the acquisition of an option as a purchase or sale will enable
courts to match sales or purchases of stock against acquisitions occurring
within less than six months. Section 16(b) liability, however, cannot attach
until profits are "realized." Thus it becomes necessary to determine
when and under what circumstances the insider may realize profit and to
determine principles for the computation of recoverable profits. Assume, for
example, that an insider sells stock at ninety dollars and within six month.-
acquires a call entitling him to purchase stock at forty dollars. Should the
market continue to drop, the insider will allow his call to expire and purchase
stock on the market. Here no profits would be recoverable since the profits
realized are not attributable to the sale of stock and acquisition of a call on
a short-swing. If the market rises to seventy dollars during the life of the call
and after the expiration of the six-month period, however, the insider will
either exercise his call or sell it unexercised. If he exercises, short-swing
profits have clearly been "realized." He has returned to his original equity
position with more cash than 'he would have had if he had carried out a long-
swing transaction in the stock alone. Sale of the option unexercised should
likewise be considered a "realization" of profit. Although sale of the call does
not in itself return the insider to his original equity position, it leaves him
with proceeds which he could use to buy stock, thus accomplishing the same
result as he could by exercise. Arguably, liability could not attach until stock
was purchased, and then only if the purchase occurred so close to the sale of
71. 132 F. Supp. at 105. Graham-Paige Motors Corp. sold its assets to Kaiser-Frazer
for a sufficient amount of Kaiser-Frazer stock to make it a 10% beneficial holder and an
insider under § 16(a). The court held the '"purchase" of stock for § 16(b) purposes did
not occur prior to the closing on Feb. 10, 1947, because prior to that time neither party
was bound. Graham-Paige could have withdrawn by failing to secure a bank loan, and
Kaiser-Frazer could have withdrawn by refusing to guarantee the loan.
72. 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1958).
1960]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the option for the transaction to be regarded as equivalent to option exercise.
According to this argument, the acquisition of a call would be a purchase only
when, as in traditional purchases, the insider is in the same equity position
with respect to the repurchased shares at the close of the transaction as at the
'beginning; hence, profits from the sale of the option would 'be no more re-
coverable than are profits from a long-swing transaction in the stock at market
price after the option has been allowed to expire. Such an approach, however,
would unnecessarily complicate the judicial administration of 16(b) in cases
involving puts and calls and might encourage their use to protect short-swing
profits. Accordingly, it is recommended that proceeds from the sale of an un-
exercised option be regarded as profits attributable to a short-swing trans-
action-purchase or sale of stock plus acquisition of an option within six
months-and therefore as profits recoverable under section 16(b).
The proper measure of recovery to apply to this short-swing transaction
would be the difference between option price (in the hypothetical, forty dol-
lars) and market price on exercise date (seventy dollars)-in other words,
the option's value at exercise date-whether profits are realized through exer-
cise or sale of the option. Recovery here is designed to eliminate any advan-
tage which the insider gained 'by acquiring an option on the short-swing.' Op-
tion value on exercise date will depend on market movements which would
'have been unfavorable to the insider had he not acquired the option. Thus, in
the hypothetical situation, the value of the call (thirty) is attributable to the
market rise to seventy. Recovery of the value of the option eliminates any
advantage attributable to the option and puts the insider in the same position
he would have occupied had he purchased stock at the market price on exer-
cise date.
When, in a profit-freezing transaction, more than six months passes between
option acquisition and disposition or exercise, however, recovery of the value
of an option may at first seem contrary to the previous suggestion that the
insider be allowed to retain profits attributable to ong-swing increments in the
worth of options.73 But both principles can be applied consistently with each
other and with the principles of 16(b). When it was urged that an insider be
credited with option value on exercise date, it was postulated that he had held
the option for more than six months prior to exercise and sale or repurchase
of stock. In such a case, inside information is of no more value to him than
if 'he had simply purchased stock on the date he acquired the option. In the
transactions now under discussion, the option -has 'been used in such a way that
inside information could 'have played a part in his maneuvers; the insider has
placed himself in a position to take advantage of market prices prevailing less
than six months after the original sale or purchase, and the length of time he
holds the option is irrelevant.
Thus the basic principle applicable to transactions in which acquisition of
a call is combined within six months with sales of the underlying stock---or
73. See text at notes 43-60 supra.
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acquisition of a put with purchases-is that when profits are realized through
sale or exercise of the option, the difference between option price and market
price on exercise or option sale date (the value of the option) is recoverable
under 16(b). 74 This principle is subject to one modification. In some cases,
the difference between option price and market price on exercise date will ex-
ceed the amount of frozen paper profits. In the hypothetical case previously
sketched, in which the insider sold stock at ninety dollars and acquired a call
enabling him to purchase at forty dollars, assume that the market rose to a
hundred dollars, instead of seventy dollars, after acquisition of the call. Apply-
mng the general rule just stated, recovery would be sixty dollars, the difference
between option price and market price at exercise date. But absent the option,
the insider would have had a long-swing loss of ten; the option has not only
frozen profits but prevented this loss. Since 16(b) evinces no policy against
the use of options to prevent loss, recovery in this type of case should be
limited to the profits attributable to the short-s\ving transaction, here fifty
dollars.
Whether the option's value should be the maximum recovery depends upon
the length of time between the two transactions in stock involved. Since the
purpose of recovery is prevention of the use of options to protect short-swing
profits, recovery of more than the option value is unnecessary when exercise
date and the initial transaction in stock are more than six months apart. The
hypothetical previously described 75 will serve as an illustration. It might seem
that since the insider sold stock at ninety dollars and repurchased it at forty
dollars through exercise of the call, recoverable profits should always be fifty
dollars. But this approach is unduly harsh, since, according to the h3ypothet-
ical's original terms, the insider could have sold stock at ninety dollars and
bought it at seventy dollars without using the option, and Without being sub-
jected to 16(b) liability. Furthermore, profits of fifty dollars would not be
recoverable when the option was sold instead of exercised, unless the courts
wished to undertake the difficult problem of determining when a purchase of
stock occurred so close to the sale of a call that the two events together could
be treated as an exercise of the call. When the sale and purchase of stock are
more than six months apart, recovery of the value of the option provides a
simple, consistent, and effective means of deterring the use of options to pro-
tect short-swing profits.
74. This principle is also applicable to puts. Suppose that a put is acquired at $90,
stock purchased at $40 within six months, and the put exercised after the six-month period
has expired when the market is $70. Here the value of the put is $20, the difference be-
tween option price (90) and market price on date of exercise (70). It is true that total
profit "frozen" is $50, the difference between option price (90) and purchase price of
stock (40). But the insider could have purchased stock at $40 and sold it at $70 instead
of exercising his put, and he could have retained the q30 profit without liability. Thus,
only the additional $20 (option value) can be considered advantage derived from short-
swing activity, and is all that should be recovered.
75. Text preceding note 73 supra.
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But profit-freezing transactions may be posited in which the purchase and
sale of stock occur within six months of each other, and here recovery should
be a figure greater than the option's value. Assume, for example, that a call
exercisable at forty dollars is acquired, followed within six months by the sale
of stock at ninety dollars, and, at a time within six months of the sale but more
than six months from the call's acquisition, by exercise when the market price
of the stock is seventy dollars. It has already been demonstrated that it would
be incorrect to credit the insider with the long-swing appreciation of his op-
tion, making recoverable profits only twenty dollars. Likewise it would ,be in-
correct to recover only the value of the option, here thirty dollars, which would
leave the insider with profits of twenty dollars on a short-swing sale of stock
at ninety dollars and purchase of stock through the call's exercise at forty
dollars. Thus recoverable profits must be fifty dollars. The -hypothetical trans-
action may be looked upon as two short-swings: (1) the acquisition of a call
and the sale of stock; and (2) the sale of stock and the exercise of the option
within a second six-month period. Profits on the first transaction-the option's
value at the date of the final transaction (here thirty dollars)-are recoverable
when realized through sale or exercise of the option whenever that occurs;
profits on the second-the difference between purchase price of the stock and
sale price of the stock (here twenty dollars)-are realized and recoverable if
sale-purchase of stock on a short-swing in fact occurs.1 0 Although the sale of
stock is common to both transactions, there should be no objection to its being
used twice,77 and a recovery of fifty dollars would eliminate all possibilities of
profiting from inside information.
In sum, profit-freezing transactions will be adequately policed by recovery
of option value-the difference between option price and market price of stock
76. Instead of the hypothetical case discussed in the text, assume that the call is sold
for $30, five months and twenty-nine days after the sale of stock, but that stock is not
purchased at $70 until six months and one day after the sale. The profit of $20 on the sale
and purchase of stock is 'by definition a nonrecoverable long-swing profit. Thus, it need
not be added to the proceeds from sale of the option in order to eliminate all short-swing
profits.
77. A dictum in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951), states that "no transaction can figure in more than one equation," that is, one
sale of stock cannot be matched against each of two purchases of stock. To do so would
give double recovery in a series of transactions involving only stock. Thus, the dictum is
correct on the facts of the Gratz case. This language should not be extended to cover
the transaction set out in text, however. Here it is proper to match the sale both against
acquisition of the call in order to recover the value of the option and against exercise in
order to recover the difference between market price on exercise date and sale price.
There is no double recovery; rather the insider is obliged to disgorge only the full amount
of profits he has actually realized.
If the option is sold rather than exercised, only the value of the option-here $30-
would be recoverable, since that would be the measure of profits realized on the short-
swing transaction matching the call's acquisition with sale of the stock. But if after the
call were transferred, stock were purchased within six months of the sale of stock, the




on exercise date-provided that this difference does not exceed the amount of
profit frozen between the sale or purchase of stock and the acquisition of the
option, plus any profits on an actual short-swing sale and purchase of stock.
But SEC rule 16b-6, which governs the purchase of stock "pursuant to the
exercise of an option... acquired more than six months before its exercise," 78
is arguably applicable to profit-freezing transactions in which a call is held for
six months 'before exercise. Rule 16b-6 measures recovery by the difference
between the proceeds of sale of stock and the lowest market price within six
months 'before or after the date of sale. Since for practical purposes call price
equals market price of the stock on the date the call is acquired, and since
acquisition date in profit-freezing transactions is by definition within six
months of a sale of stock, rule 16b-6 would lead to the recovery of the full
differential between option price and sale price. But, aside from the previously
delineated defects of 16b-6,79 the rule should not prevent the imposition of the
smaller recovery represented by option value when appropriate. By its own
terms 16b-6 is designed to limit rather than to increase profits recoverable
under 16(b), leaving the courts free to impose a lesser measure of recovery.8,
Furthermore, the Commission release issued when the rule was promulgated
indicates that the Commission gave little or no consideration to transactions
in which options are used to protect short-swing profits.81 And since 16b-6 is
inapplicable to puts and to sales of unexercised options, the rule may be dis-
regarded when either puts or calls are used in a profit-freezing context.
Complicating considerations arise in transactions involving either two sales
or two purchases of stock-one sale or purchase occurring within six months
of the acquisition of an option and the other within six months of its exercise.
Assume a sale of stock at ninety dollars, followed within six months by ac-
quisition of a call exercisable at forty dollars. More than six months after the
initial sale, the call is exercised when market price is seventy dollars, and,
within six months of exercise, the stock is resold at 105 dollars. Here the
insider 'has actually acquired stock only once-on exercise date-- although
his power to buy at option price became fixed when the call was acquired.
Thus it might be argued that either acquisition date or exercise date, but not
both, could be considered a purchase. This transaction could then 'be analyzed
either as profit freezing-sale of stock accompanied within six months by the
acquisition of a call-or as a transaction in which exercise is step one in a
short-swing in stock. If the former, purchase would be deemed to have taken
place on acquisition date, and recovery would be thirty dollars, the value of
the option. If the latter, purchase would be deemed to have taken place on
exercise date and recovery under the previously suggested analogy to the Park
78. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (Supp. 1959). Pertinent portions of the rule are quoted in
note 44 supra.
79. See text at notes 49-51 mtpra.
80. See te-t of rule supra note 44 ("nothing in this [rule] ... shall be deemed to
enlarge the amount of 1profit which would inure to the corporation in the absence of the
... [rule]").
81. See SEC Sec. Act Release No. 4509, Oct. 30, 1950.
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& Tilford case would be thirty-five dollars.8 2 A court would probably pick the
second alternative, since it gives the larger recovery. 3 If both acquisition and
exercise can 'be regarded as purchases for 16(b) purposes, however, profits
attributable to 'both the profit-freezing and the exercise transactions will be
recoverable, giving a total of sixty-five dollars. Suppose the insider had sold
the option on exercise date, receiving proceeds of thirty dollars. These pro-
ceeds would ,be recoverable as profits realized on the short-swing profit-freez-
ing transaction. A purchase of stock at seventy dollars followed two months
later by sale of stock at 105 dollars would produce recoverable profits of
thirty-five dollars. Thus, if the transaction took this form, recoverable profits
would clearly 'be sixty-five dollars. Since exercise of a call may be regarded as
equivalent to a sale of the call accompanied by the purchase of stock, the fact
that the option is exercised should not produce a different result. Recovery
of the full profit is in accordance with the scheme of 16(b). Acquisition of the
option froze profits on a speculation conclusively presumed to have been an
abuse of inside information. Assuming the option was terminable, exercise
gave the insider a new opportunity to misuse inside information to take ad-
vantage of the short-swing between exercise and sale.
Profit-freezing transactions need not be confined to the forms discussed here.
For example, acquisition of a call at a low price might be followed by acquisi-
tion of a put at a high price. Or a sale of common stock might be followed
by the purchase of convertible preferred. Such cases may 'be easily solved by
applying the basic principle underlying profit-freezing liability-that purchases
and sales of different classes of equity securities may be matched when one
class is convertible into the other or where ,both classes are convertible into
the same class of equity security.8 4 Although difference in market prices may
make computation of recoverable profits difficult, failure to recognize this prin-
ciple would make for easy evasion of 16(b). For by acquiring a convertible
security as part of a short-swing, the insider obtains a potential advantage he
would not have had if he had simply carried out a long-swing transaction in
securities of the same type. Possibly this advantage will not be turned to profit
since the insider may allow the conversion feature of the convertible security
to expire. When he converts or sells the conversion security while it is still
convertible, however, any advantage secured as the result of the short-swing
transaction should constitute recoverable profit.
OTHER PROBLEMS INVOLVING PUTS AND CALLS
Acquisition of Options as a "Change in Beneficial Ownership"
If acquisition of a call is treated as a purchase of stock and acquisition of
a put as a sale for purposes of 16(b), it may be argued that such purchases
82. See text at notes 47-48 mtpra.
83. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 51-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920
(1951).
84. Compare Comment, 59 YAIE Lj. 510, 533 (1950).
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and sales constitute changes in beneficial ownership which must be taken into
account in determining whether or not a shareholder is a ten per cent beneficial
owner and hence an insider under 16(a). Some support for this position may
be derived from SEC rule 16a-1 (h) under which acquisition of a put or call
is "deemed to be such a change in beneficial ownership" of the underlying
securities as to require reporting.8 5 The classification of ten per cent beneficial
owners as insiders, however, is based on a conclusive presumption that the
owner of ten per cent of any one class of a corporation's equity securities has
such control over corporate policies and access to inside information that
speculative abuses are possible. Obviously, such access and control are not
diminished by the acquisition of puts. The ownership of a call, on the other
hand, resembles beneficial ownership of stock in some respects. For example,
any dividends declared during the life of the call will be credited against ex-
ercise price.86 But the right to dividends is conditioned on exercise and is of
little importance for section 16 purposes. More relevant is the possibility that
the owner of calls, having the power at any time to obtain control of stock,
might reasonably be supposed to have more access to inside information and
to exercise a greater measure of control than his actual stockholdings might
indicate. But to elevate this possibility to the status of a conclusive presump-
tion by holding, for example, that a nine per cent owner who acquires calls on
an additional one per cent thereby becomes an insider seems somewhat far
fetched. Under existing law, "beneficial ownership" is held to remain un-
changed until there is a "firm commitment" to purchase or sell securities,81
and acquisition of a call gives rise to no such commitment.
85. For the purposes of this section the acquisition or disposition of any transferable
option, put, call, spread, or straddle shall be deemed such a change in the beneficial
ownership of the security to which such privilege relates as to require the filing of
a report reflecting the acquisition or disposition of such privilege. Nothing in this
paragraph, however, shall exempt any person from filing the reports required upon
the exercise of such option, put, call, spread, or straddle.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(h) (Supp. 1959).
86. See Fuxa. 75-76.
87. See Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1956), cit-
ing with approval SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 116, March 9, 1935, 11 Fed. Reg.
10968 (1946):
In my opinion an officer, director or stockholder is to be deemed to have ac-
quired beneficial ownership of a security at the time when he takes a firm com-
mitment for the purchase thereof, arid to divest himself of such ownership at the
time when he takes a firm commitment for the sale thereof. If it is necessary that
certain conditions be satisfied prior to the consummation of the purchase or sale,
and if it is uncertain whether such conditions will be satisfied, then it would appear
that the officer, director, or stockholder would not acquire beneficial ownership, or
divest himself thereof, until such time as such conditions are satisfied and the under-
taking to purchase or sell becomes a firm commitment.
See also Loss 584-86.
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Puts as Short Sales
Not to be overlooked in connection with puts is section 16(c),88 which pro-
hibits "short sales" and "sales against the box"8' 9 by insiders. If the acquisi-
tion of a put is a "sale" for 16(c) purposes, it would 'be unlawful for an in-
sider who owned no stock in his corporation to acquire a put 'because 16(c)
(1) forbids short sales-selling "any equity security of such issuer .. .if the
person selling the security or his principal ... does not own the security sold."
If the insider already owned the stock on which he purchased his put, appli-
cation of the proposed definition of "sale" would require any put acquired to
be exercised so that the stock could 'be delivered "against such sale within
twenty days thereafter" as required by 16(c) (2)'s prohibition of sales against
the 'box. Whether such a position should be adopted depends on the purposes
of 16(c). Arguably, the section indicates congressional intent that no insider
be allowed to profit from a drop in the value of his corporation's securities,
thus bringing puts within the spirit of the section. 0
But other considerations make it undesirable to hold a put a "sale" for pur-
poses of section 16(c). Legislative history indicates that Congress felt short
sales should be regulated because market declines are accelerated when short-
88. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1958):
It shall be unlawful for any such beneficial owner, director, or officer, directly
or indirectly, to sell any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted
security), if the person selling the security or his principal (1) does not own the
security sold, or (2) if owning the security, does not deliver it against such sale
within twenty days thereafter, or does not within five days after such sale deposit
it in the mails or other usual channels of transportation; but no person shall be
deemed to have violated this subsection if he proves that notwithstanding tile ex-
ercise of good faith he was unable to make such delivery or deposit within such
time, or that to do so would cause undue inconvenience or expense.
89. In "sales against the box" the
seller owns and possesses stock which he can deliver but which for some reason
he prefers not to deliver. This is a device which can be employed by corporate
officials and insiders who desire to sell their corporation's stock short without dis-
closing such short selling. Like the ordinary short seller, he borrows stock for
the purpose of making delivery. It is contended by stock-exchange authorities that
a sale "against the box" is not a short sale, since the customer need not buy the
stock back but may make delivery from the securities in his box. It is plain, how-
ever, that where a person initially makes a sale "against the box" but subsequently
changes his mind, there is nothing to prevent him from covering in the open mar-
ket. In such case he is indistinguishable from any other short seller.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1934) ; see Bakal, Playboy Plays the Market,
Playboy, Oct. 1959, p. 68, at 109.
90. Section 10(a) of the Securities Exchange Act places short sales generally under
the regulatory power of the SEC. 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (a) (1958). Rule
10a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1949), regulates prices at which short sales can be made,
and requires "short" and "long" sales to be identified. Rule 10a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 2 40.10a-2
(1949), provides penalties for brokers who assist in carrying out a sale violating rule
10a-1. Short sales by noninsiders complying with these rules are permitted.
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sellers contribute their stock sales to an already overburdened market.Y1 In
prohibiting insider short-sales, Congress may also have been concerned with
the psychological effect of insider sales in a falling market.02 Acquisition of a
put does not involve an actual sale of stock on the market and therefore does
not directly accelerate market declines. When the insider acquires a put with-
out owning the stock, puts may actually bolster declining prices somewhat,
since the option holder must buy stock in order to exercise the put. Unlike
ordinary short-sellers who attempt to wait until the market has hit bottom
before covering their short-sale, the holder of a put must make his purchase
prior to expiration, even though the market may not have reached bottom of
its downswing.93 Furthermore, it is doubtful if the acquisition of a put, even
-though publicized under 16(a), would have as great a psychological impact
on the market as does an actual sale of stock. Finally, the use of puts in
various legitimate "insurance" transactions 0 4 would no longer be possible if
acquisition were to be deemed a sale under section 16(c). On balance, then,
it seems that no compelling reason exists for construing "sale" as broadly in
16(c) as in 16(b). Indeed, since violation of 16(c) may lead to criminal
penalties,9 5 such a construction may violate due-process standards. Criminal
statutes are ordinarily strictly construed and must apprise the offender of the
exact nature of the violation.9 6
Insider Writing of Puts and Calls
The "maling" or "writing" of puts and calls may provide insiders w'ith an
opportunity to profit from inside information without incurring 16(b) lia-
bility. Writers of puts and calls receive premiums from option buyers. If the
put or call is allowed to lapse, this premium is retained by the writer.0 7 An
insider with advance knowledge of a probable short-swing rise could write
puts giving the holders the right to sell to him at the then market price. As
the market rises, the puts will be permitted to expire and the insider-writer
can pocket the premium. Although his profit will be less than if he had bought
and sold stock or options to purchase, he will have avoided section 16. Even
91. See Loss 675.
92. Public knowledge of sales of large blocks of stock by insiders may have an ad-
verse effect on the market. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1960, p. 46, col. I (American
Motors drops 932 points following announcement of large sale by corporation president
George Romney).
93. According to one authority on puts and calls, the effect of option trading is to
stabilize the market. See Fn=r 74-75.
94. "Profit-freezing" itself involves the use of puts and calls as "hedges" or "insur-
ance." Hedging transactions would seem legitimate under § 16(b) if the "hedge" does not
protect short-swing profits. For examples of hedging transactions, see FnrE 46-48.
95. Section 32, 48 Stat 904 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1958), provides for penalties
up to $10,000 or not more than 2 years imprisonment, or both. for willful violations of
any provisions of the act making the violation "unlawful."
96. See Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 91 (1959).
97. For a detailed discussion of option writing, see Fuam 96-111.
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if the sale of a newly written put or call constitutes a "disposition" of the
option so as to require reportng in compliance with 16a as interpreted in rule
16a-1(h), 16b liability will not follow for no purchase-sale combination has
occurred. The possibility of exposure may well serve to deter insider option
writing. Option writing is ordinarily carried on secretly, as the brokers who
deal in puts and calls do not divulge the identity of the writers.08 In any event,
it seems unlikely that insider option writing will become a widespread prob-
lem, since the writing of puts and calls primarily appeals to large investors
seeking a steady return on their portfolios rather than to insiders making
short-swing speculations.D
98. See LEFFLER 372.
99. See note 18 sapra.
